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Abstract
Argentina’s recent trajectory has provoked several discussions in the last few years. Most of them 
have centred on the character of the new mode of development presumed to have appeared in 
the wake of the crisis of neoliberal rule. This article provides an analysis of the changes and 
continuities in capitalist development in Argentina after the crisis of 2001. We provide extensive 
evidence regarding changes in the mode of development which, we propose, has shifted towards 
a neo-developmentalist alternative. While we argue that this strategy perpetuates capitalist 
domination, more importantly we stress that it also implies signifĳicant changes from the previous 
pattern of development. Particularly, the new mode of capitalist development creates a new set 
of public policies that mediate class-conflict in renewed ways.
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1. Introduction
In a recent review-article, Jefffery R. Webber discusses a new contribution to 
the analysis of neostructuralism1 in which neostructuralism is described as the 
ideological and theoretical underpinning of most of the new ‘progressive’ 
governments that have been gaining support in several countries in Latin 
America, as part of the so-called ‘pink tide’. We believe that such a discussion 
is very relevant to understanding the nature of current sociopolitical 
transformations on the subcontinent, particularly in the midst of the deep 
crisis of dominant capitalist spaces. As part of this debate we present a 
contribution that attempts to shed some light on Argentina’s conjuncture. We 
feel that the debate is particularly important in regard to the nature of changes 
1. Webber 2010.
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in the process of capitalist development in Argentina and the rôle of social 
forces in such changes. Clarifying the nature of the debate is of great relevance 
for all the new radical sociopolitical movements that are working towards 
social change in the region.
This article is structured as follows. In Section 2 we briefly describe the 
process of the crisis of neoliberalism in Argentina and the original constitution 
of neo-developmentalism. In Section 3 we present the main novelties with 
regard to public policies, discussing neo-developmentalism’s ties to structural 
continuities and changes. In Section 4 we discuss the way in which the 
contradictions of this new form of capitalist development manifest themselves. 
Finally, in Section 5 we present some preliminary conclusions.
2. From neoliberal crisis to a new form of capitalist development
After a process of 30 years of restructuring, in early 2002 Argentina leaped 
forward out of neoliberalism.2 In consonance with several processes of popular 
resistance and economic crisis around the periphery (and especially in South 
America)3 Argentina abandoned its place as the International Monetary Fund’s 
most brilliant pupil to join the neo-developmentalist crowd. The offfĳicial story 
of this transition is that a new political coalition had been formed and that it 
represented a radical break with its neoliberal past.4 The new policies in place 
represented – again, according to the offfĳicial record – the rebirth of politics 
and the stabilisation of a new mode of development of ‘serious capitalism’ (as 
against the ‘speculative capitalism’ of previous decades) based on regained 
autonomy from fĳinancial capital and its representatives.
Neoliberalism in Argentina was a process that began in the 1970s.5 The 
violent irruption of a military dictatorship in 1976 was its overt initiation with 
political repression and not-always-successful attempts at economic 
2. In an attempt to present a preliminary defĳinition of neoliberalism we may say that we 
understand it as a political project of the dominant classes to restructure society (the economy, 
politics, the state) in a way that will allow them to recover hegemony over the process of 
valorisation and capital-accumulation. In a way, it is a project for ‘the restoration of capitalist 
class-power and the accelerated redistribution of wealth from the popular classes to a tiny élite’ 
(Webber 2010, p. 227). This was made possible through the variable combination of political 
repression, economic crisis, and deregulation and flexibilisation of economic activities. As such, 
through neoliberalism dominant fractions within capital have been able to reconfĳigure society in 
such a way so as to create the conditions for sustained capital-accumulation.
3. See Thwaites Rey 2010.
4. See MEP 2007.
5. While neoliberalism and neo-developmentalism are processes situated within the wider 
dynamics of the international economy, in this intervention we wish to concentrate our debate 
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liberalisation.6 After the recuperation of democracy in 1983, Argentina entered 
the second stage of the neoliberal period. The stage spanning 1983–9 was a 
conflictive period of sociopolitical (class) clashes regarding the imposition of 
new neoliberal rules of production and reproduction of society.7 However, the 
dominant classes had to wait until the 1990s for a democratic government 
(with the election of the Peronist Carlos Menem in 1989) to be able to advance 
in their full-blown project of International Monetary Fund- and World Bank-
inspired structural reforms: the so-called ‘convertibility-plan’.
The convertibility-plan included fĳixing the nominal exchange-rate to the US 
dollar, the privatisation of most public companies and public services 
(including social security), the flexibilisation of labour-market legislation, the 
deregulation of economic activities (in particular, regarding the participation 
of foreign capital in the local economy) and the unilateral liberalisation of 
foreign-trade and fĳinancial-capital movements, amongst other reforms. The 
result was a jump in imports of consumer-goods, the destruction of thousands 
of small and middle-sized fĳirms, a hike in unemployment and poverty-rates, 
and the stagnation of wages and nationwide precarisation of labour.8 If the 
reforms were highly destructive in terms of social welfare, they simultaneously 
allowed for the accelerated concentration and centralisation of capital along 
with the growth of its acquisition by foreign fĳirms and the improvement in 
industrial productivity (particularly in export-oriented agricultural and mining 
businesses) with the aid of the import of capital goods.
Until the mid-1990s the advancement of neoliberal reforms was swift.9 
However, political opposition and objective contradictions were also building 
up. In 1992 several trade-unions within the Confederación General del Trabajo 
[General Confederation of Labour, CGT] parted and created a new confederation, 
Central de los Trabajadores de la Argentina [The Argentine Workers’ Central 
Union, CTA]; together with a sector that remained within the CGT (led by the 
truckers’ union) they began to express their concern at the social efffects of 
restructuration. In parallel, university-students, small-business organisations, 
upon the – less-known and understood – local means through which such processes have 
developed in the setting of Argentina.
6. See, for example, Canitrot 1981. Actually, as a historical fact the process of transformations 
had its initial milestone in June 1975 with the so-called Rodrigazo, an economic programme 
through which the dominant classes – during the Peronist government of those years – began to 
pave the way to redesigning the whole process of capital-valorisation in Argentina. See Basualdo 
2006.
7. See Bonnet and Glavich 1993.
8. See Lindenboim 2003.
9. See Bonnet 2006.
108 M. Féliz / Historical Materialism 20.2 (2012) 105–123
public employees, retired workers and the unemployed began the ‘political 
recomposition’10 of the working class against neoliberal rule.
While political reactions where escalating, neoliberalism in Argentina was 
also creating its own set of objective contradictions.11 The most visible elements 
of concern were a growing trade-defĳicit and a rising fĳiscal defĳicit and foreign-
debt expenditures. Behind the scenes, increasing contradictions arising from 
the capitalist nature of production were placing pressure on capital’s ability to 
reproduce on an expanded scale. First, a rising organic composition of capital 
entailed a growing inability of the economy to produce sufffĳicient amounts of 
surplus-labour compared with capital expenditure. The organic composition 
of capital – estimated as the ratio between the material substrate of constant 
capital (real capital-stock) and variable capital (number of hours worked in the 
economy) – grew 15.8% in Argentina between 1992 and 1998, and then 12.7% 
between 1998 and 2001.12 Second, there was a growing disparity between falling 
unit labour-costs and nominal prices that manifested itself in a tendency 
towards deflation. These contradictions were displaced in time and space by 
rising terms of trade until 1997 and a growing world-economy until 1998. 
Eventually, however, the counteracting forces were unable to avoid adjustment: 
real GDP fell 7.7% between 1998 and 2000. From mid-1998 onwards, Argentina’s 
economy entered a process of increasing difffĳiculties with respect to realising 
profĳits, accelerated transformation of available surplus-value into its fĳinancial 
form (interest-payments and capital-flight) and – as political turmoil gained 
momentum – the diminishing ability of capital in general to carry out successful 
exploitation.13
Between late 2001 and early 2002, political and economic contradictions 
combined to violently disarm neoliberal hegemony.14 The exit from the crisis 
seemed to have opened up a Pandora’s box regarding political alternatives. 
Social opposition to neoliberal rule manifested itself in massive mobilisation 
and rejection of the political status quo.15 The interim government elected by 
Congress (Eduardo Duhalde, from the Peronist Party, was appointed president) 
set out to regain political control of the situation. In January 2002 the 
convertibility-plan was abandoned, the local currency devalued, a signifĳicant 
10. See Cleaver 1985.
11. See Féliz 2011b, 2009 and 2007.
12. See Féliz 2011b. The original statistical information is that provided by offfĳicial sources such 
as the Ministry of the Economy and Production (MEP), the Ministry of Labour, Employment and 
Social Security (MTESS), the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) and the National Institute of 
Statistics and the Census (INDEC), amongst others, and it is readily available from their respective 
web-sites. 
13. See Bonnet 2006.
14. See Bonnet 2006; Carrera 2006.
15. See Dinerstein 2002.
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part of public debt entered into default, and a large part of dollar-denominated 
debts of private debtors were absorbed by the state and turned into public 
debt, amongst other measures. The immediate efffect of these policies was 
harsh: between 2001 and 2002, real wages fell by 19% on average, the income 
poverty-rate jumped to 53% of the population in May 2002, real consumption 
dropped 12.6% during the fĳirst trimester of 2002, and the price-index for 
foodstufffs went up by 48.6% within the fĳirst semester of 2002.
This shaped the macroeconomic conditions for renewed capitalist expansion 
as profĳit-rates for big corporations hiked and net exports turned positive. 
However, it had also corresponded to a situation of great political instability, 
particularly due to the non-institutional struggles of the movements of 
unemployed workers [piqueteros] and sectors of the middle-classes.16 To 
combat militant opposition by the piquetero-movement, in March 2002 
the government implemented an ample income-support programme for 
unemployed heads of households: Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar Desocupados 
(PJJHD). These social and economic policies, combined with the targeted 
repression of social conflict, granted Duhalde’s government enough political 
space to manage the initial steps in the transition out of neoliberalism. 
However, the repression of a piquetero-protest on 26 June 2002 that ended with 
the assassination of two activists by the police obliged the interim government 
to call for elections for early 2003. The Peronist Néstor Kirchner was elected 
and assumed offfĳice on 25 May 2003 with the objective of consolidating a new 
process of successful capitalist accumulation in Argentina. This process – 
which we term ‘neo-developmentalism’ – was built on the new social hegemony 
(created during neoliberal rule) by concentrated capital and a renewed political 
composition of the working classes.17
3. New policies for a new form of the state
Kirchner’s government inherited and perfected a new combination of policies 
that allowed for the expanded reproduction of capital with a partial recovery 
of employment-conditions for signifĳicant sectors within the labouring classes.
16. See Dinerstein 2002; Bonnet 2006; Carrera 2006.
17. We understand neo-developmentalism as more than ‘discursive innovations that operate 
within the parameters of actually-existing neoliberalism’, as Webber 2010, p. 227, sustains. As we 
will show, neo-developmentalism in Argentina is built on the structural transformations created 
by neoliberalism, but it implies much more than discursive innovations for it has signifĳied very 
real changes in state-intervention, class-composition and the general dynamics of capitalist 
development. That said, neo-developmentalism maintains the main traits exhibited by 
neoliberalism but represents a whole new level of capitalist development and contradictions.
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At a macroeconomic level the orientation of policies can be reduced to fĳive 
elements.18 First, the attempt at maintaining a high (competitive) and stable 
real exchange-rate; second, renegotiation of public debt so as to make it 
payable in an expansive macroeconomic environment; third, control of public 
expenditures (especially public employees’ wages) and incomes to maintain a 
fĳiscal surplus high enough to pay for the service of the renegotiated public 
debt; fourth, to contain wage-negotiations in the private sector within the 
limits of middle-run productivity-growth and objectives for the real exchange-
rate; fĳifth, to monetise the surplus of the foreign accounts (accumulation of 
international reserves) to control the real exchange-rate.
The objective of a high and stable real exchange-rate was the key element in 
the new macroeconomic policy and it was aimed at maintaining the 
competitiveness of capital in general. For the most part, all other policies were 
subordinated to that end. This policy-goal has been proposed as the principal 
means of ‘development’.19 In fact, as explained by Robert Blecker, maintaining 
a high real exchange-rate by a combination of higher relative productivity-
growth and/or lower relative real wages can be thought of as an efffĳicient 
way to ensure that oligopolistic capitals in a national space obtain higher 
profĳit-rates.20 From 2002 to 2009 the neo-developmentalist project in Argentina 
has been quite successful in respect of this objective: the level of the real 
exchange-rate has been on average 46.6% higher than during the boom-years 
of convertibility (1991–8) and 33.7% higher than during the crisis-years (1999–
2001). This goal was achieved through the combination of a higher level of 
productivity (the rate between 2002 and 2009 was 52.7% higher than that 
between 1991 and 1998) and a level of real average wages that was 9.6% below 
that for 2001 (on average between 2002 and 2009). Both higher relative 
productivity and lower relative real wages have been one of the successful 
achievements of neoliberalism in terms of capital’s goals.21 The result of this 
macroeconomic policy has been to keep profĳit-rates for big corporations at 
high historical levels: the ratio of profĳits to circulating capital averaged 16.6% 
in 2006–7 (according to the latest available fĳigures) in contrast with 11.2% at 
the previous peak (1997).22
The post-crisis recomposition of conditions for valorisation of capital 
allowed for a process of sustained accumulation. From 2002 to 2008 real GDP 
18. See Curia 2007; Frenkel and Rapetti 2004; FGV 2010.
19. See Frenkel and Rapetti 2004.
20. See Blecker 1999.
21. See Féliz 2009.
22. The source of the information on big corporations comes from the Survey of Big Business 
performed by the INDEC. It provides information on the 500 biggest-selling fĳirms.
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grew at an average of 8.5% annually while fĳixed-capital investment jumped 
from a low 11.3% of GDP in 2002 to top 21.1% in early 2010. Accelerated growth 
in constant capital was accompanied by a signifĳicant increase in variable 
capital. Employment-levels grew by 3.4 million posts between 2002 and 2009; 
the unemployment rate fell from 19.7% (of the economically active population) 
in 2002 to 8.1% in early 2010. While on average lower than during the 1990s, real 
wages grew by 18.2% between 2002 and 2010 (32.6% for formal workers).23
The relative improvement in labour-conditions was a combined result of 
several elements at work. On the one hand, the previous process of labour-
political recomposition gave birth to new forces within the old labour-
organisations. During and especially after the crisis there was growing 
grass-roots agitation in the most important trade-unions. Basic struggles on the 
shop-floors for immediate economic demands were led by young activists – in 
some cases tied to political organisations from the Left – and their increasing 
uneasiness forced trade-union bureaucracies to make active demands for 
state-intervention.24 Secondly, the falling unemployment-rate and increasing 
potential demand for labour-power created better objective conditions for 
labour’s demands to be satisfĳied. In contrast to the neoliberal stage when 
capital’s restructuration was the norm, neo-developmentalism was built 
on structural conditions tailor-made for allowing partial improvements in 
labour-employment at least within the formal sectors of the economy. In fact, 
collective bargaining gained momentum, as labour-struggles were oriented by 
the state and by corporations toward formal negotiation and away from direct 
action. The number of collective agreements went from an average of less than 
200 a year between 1991 and 2001 to a peak of close to 950 in 2006.25 Finally, 
the state’s pressing need for political relegitimation led it to channel through 
institutional paths the demands of powerful Peronist private-sector unions, 
such as the Camioneros (the truckers’ union in the leadership of the CGT), or 
the Unión de Obreros Metalúrgicos [Union of Metallurgical Workers, UOM] and 
23. The use of the consumer-price index requires further explanation. In early 2007 the 
government intervened in the INDEC and began tampering with price-statistics (ATE-INDEC 
2008). The goal was to reduce the offfĳicial inflation-record and – hopefully – control the price-
wage spiral, amongst other things. Since then, suspicion regarding the offfĳicial consumer-price 
index has lead researchers to look for other sources of price-information (private surveys, 
information from provincial statistical offfĳices, etc.). For that reason, we have used as the ‘real’ 
price-index from 2007 to 2010 the information provided by the private think-tank CENDA. While 
its index is not strictly comparable with the offfĳicial one, we believe – along with many other 
researchers in the country – that it provides a more accurate account of actual consumer-
inflation.
24. See Etchemendy and Berins Collier 2007.
25. See MTESS 2006.
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the industrial workers’ union Sindicato de Mecánicos y Afĳines del Transporte 
Automotores [Union of Automotive Mechanics and Related Professions, 
SMATA]. This process was made possible mostly through the reactivation of 
traditional policies: a state-decreed, non-proportional rise in wages, increases 
in minimum wages, reductions in employee-paid labour-taxes and increases in 
child-support benefĳits, all for private-sector registered employees. Regarding 
informally employed workers and state-employees, proactive policy was 
much more restricted: in the fĳirst case, the incidence of public policies was 
limited, while in the case of public employees the objective of positive public 
savings (i.e., a primary fĳiscal surplus to allow for debt-payments) put a lid on 
improvements. The CTA – whose mobilisation-base was the public sector’s 
employees and teachers – had little chance to influence the new government 
which was more inclined to look for political allies in the Peronist CGT.
These policies were key in the neo-developmentalist régime’s search for 
political stability within a capitalist mode of development based on primary 
agro-mining and cheap-labour manufacturing exports.26 Bresser-Pereira, a 
prime advocate of neo-developmentalism in the region, puts it clearly when he 
states that, in an age of globalisation, export-led growth is the only viable 
strategy for developing countries and that it requires a competitive advantage 
based on a cheap labour-force.27
Thus even if it is true that successful accumulation was able to reduce general 
unemployment, the policy of a high and stable real exchange-rate which allowed 
this process was based on a simple but fundamental fact: the pervasiveness and 
persistence of the precariousness of work as a means to put a structural lid on 
labour’s demands.28 Even today (2010), with the economy at its peak with 
regards to production (real GDP) – 42.5% higher than its previous peak of 1998 
– the incidence of non-registered labour is 44.7% in the private sector, while at 
least 13% of public employees have ‘trash-contracts’. Income-poverty, moreover, 
reportedly afffects more than 17.6% of the working population.29 The persistence 
of such situations is indicative of the rôle played by precariousness as a means 
of keeping down labour-costs in the private sector and maintaining the public 
sector’s fĳiscal surplus. Indeed, in comparison with registered workers, real 
wages for non-registered labourers and public employees have grown 23% and 
122% less, respectively. This means that while real wages for registered workers 
have surpassed their 2001 level, in the case of non-registered and public 
employees they are still 5.4% and 28.9% below that level.
26. See Féliz and López 2010a.
27. Bresser-Pereira 2010, p. 158.
28. See Rameri, Rafffo and Lozano 2008; Lindenboim 2008.
29. See Féliz and López 2010b; Féliz, López and Fernández 2010.
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However, while neo-developmentalism in Argentina presents signifĳicant 
changes in macroeconomic and labour-policies, even more signifĳicant policy-
innovations are evident in the sphere of social policy. As precariousness of 
labour remains rampant but organically integrated with the reproduction of 
capital, the political alliances in power since 2002 have had to deal with its 
political consequences. Piquetero-movements became one of the main 
obstacles to stability from the beginning of this new stage. The key factor in the 
ousting of neoliberalism and in the 2002 resistance, the piqueteros were still 
sufffĳiciently uncontrollable as to require the dominant classes to adopt major 
policy-changes.30
First of all, as we have explained, in 2002 the government was forced to 
create a massive social programme (the PJJHD, within the Ministry of Social 
Development) to cover almost 2 million direct benefĳiciaries in mid-2003 with 
a minimum income-subsidy of 40 US dollars per month.31 Participation in the 
programme had almost no real prerequisites. Apart from having no formal job, 
that is, ‘being unemployed’, the programme required that the benefĳiciaries 
participate in community-work in social projects such as ‘soup-kitchens’, 
small-scale production of foodstufffs (for example, bread, cheese, etc.) or the 
building of local infrastructure (such as community-halls); in many cases, 
however, the benefĳiciaries were obliged to work for local governments and 
their political overlords, in a clientelistic fashion. To facilitate the performance 
of these counterpart-activities, the PJJHD was complemented by the Plan 
Manos a la Obra [Hands-to-Work Plan, PMO] that provided benefĳiciaries with 
access to minimum resources to acquire (in collective projects) small means of 
production or tools. The PJJHD was meant to weaken the social base of 
piquetero-organisations that in the 1990s and through direct action (road-
blockades) had been able to gain from the state the control of several thousand 
income-benefĳits.32 While the almost universal access to the PJJHD reduced the 
political clout of the movements of the unemployed, it did not, however, 
completely neutralise them. Progressively minimum wages grew in real terms 
and the benefĳits of the PJJHD remained fĳixed in nominal (and fell in real) 
terms. Since its creation in 2002, the nominal value of the benefĳits of the PJJHD 
has remained at 150 pesos, while the legal minimum wage has gone from 200 
pesos to 1,500 pesos. Thus, employment-growth – even if precarious – tended 
to divert some of the benefĳiciaries away from the PJJHD.
By 2003 the government decided to go deeper into a new model of social 
policies put in place by the PMO: access to benefĳits subsequently required the 
30. See Svampa and Pereyra 2003; Dinerstein, Contartese and Deledicque 2010.
31. See Féliz 2011a.
32. See Golbert 2004.
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active participation of those in need.33 The ‘poor’ were expected to prove their 
merit in order to become benefĳiciaries. They were compelled to show their 
willingness to actively participate in socially worthwhile deeds, and the state 
would be the judge of such social value. These programmes were very much in 
line with the World Bank’s proposals for second-generation social policies. In 
fact, from the beginning this institution provided the government with fĳinancial 
assistance to implement many of these programmes. This was the case, for 
example, when the national government created the Plan Familias para la 
Inclusión Social [Family-Plan for Social Inclusion, ‘Plan Familias’] and the 
Programa de Capacitación y Empleo [Programme of Employment and Training, 
PCE].34 Designed to gradually replace the PJJHD, the Plan Familias was oriented 
toward those deemed unemployable (for example, single mothers with 
children) while the PCE was oriented to the employable (for example, men).35 
The only condition for participation in the Plan Familias was that benefĳiciaries 
send their children to school and medical controls, whereas in the case of the 
PCE benefĳiciaries needed to participate in training programmes and search for 
work. The monetary benefĳits of the Plan Familias and the PCE were respectively 
about 100 US dollars and 70 US dollars, so that progressively the benefĳiciaries 
of the PJJHD transferred to these new programmes or obtained formal 
employment. Together with falling unemployment, the individualisation of 
the benefĳits and segmentation of the benefĳiciaries meant a slow but persistent 
erosion of the social base of the piquetero-movements.
However, while the creation of the programmes weakened these disruptive 
organisations, their influence remained important as they privileged direct 
action and non-institutional intervention. Taking this into account, the newly 
elected government proposed in 2003 to introduce a new paradigm in policies 
for social infrastructure.36 Modelled on the PMO, the Plan Federal de Emergencia 
Habitacional [Federal Plan for Housing Emergency, PFEH] or the Plan Agua + 
Trabajo [Programme for Water plus Work, PA+T] came into action. These lines 
of action (which included several sub-programmes) had the objective of 
attacking huge defĳicits in housing (in quantity and quality) and water-supply 
and sewage by paying the future benefĳiciaries to work on these programmes as 
cheap labour. As a model for further actions, participation in these programmes 
required that benefĳiciaries group together in formal cooperatives and in most 
cases also included the mediation of local governments. The battle for 
participation in these programmes required Piquetero and other social 
33. See Dinerstein, Contartese and Deledicque 2010.
34. See Féliz 2011a.
35. See Féliz and Pérez 2010.
36. See Dinerstein, Contartese and Deledicque 2010.
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movements to get involved in formal bureaucratic procedures that tended to 
partially contain disruptive actions. In addition, the government made active 
use of these programmes to favour allied social organisations, such as the 
Federación de Tierra y Vivienda [Federation of Land and Housing, FTV].37 Such 
organisations were willing to accept resources in exchange for ceasing 
mobilisation and direct action as a means of negotiation, and generally lowered 
the tone of their critical interventions. Coupled with selective repression 
(diffferent to the widespread repression of social mobilisation during the 1990s) 
cooptation acted as an efffective means for social control. Conflictive 
normalisation of social struggles became the rule in neo-developmentalism.38
The successful combination of new macroeconomic policies, rehabilitation 
of traditional interventions in trade-unions, and novel social policies are key to 
understanding the particular characteristics of the new form of state 
constitutive of ‘neo-developmentalism’.
4. A new ‘model’ comes with new contradictions
The new form of development in Argentina (neo-developmentalism) appears 
to have been able to channel its contradictions in a productive way (for capital) 
and stabilise a new development-path.39 However, we will argue that it has 
only temporarily displaced some of the old contradictions, while creating a 
series of new ones.
In neoliberal Argentina – particularly during the 1990s – one of the main 
contradictions appeared to be the opposition between ‘productive’ and 
‘fĳinancial’ capital. This was evident, for example, in the privatisation of social 
security for the elderly with the creation of private pension-funds and the 
growing weight of public and private debt. Since 2002, we have witnessed a 
process of rolling back from such overt domination of fĳinance without, 
however, making it disappear. There has been a reduction of public debt that 
included a cessation in payments on a signifĳicant portion for several years and 
a process of debt-reduction at the creditor’s cost.40 This, however, has only 
meant that the weight of public debt has gone back in 2009 to the 1998 levels of 
about 50% of GDP and interest-payments to 2.5% of GDP. Private foreign debt, 
meanwhile, remains at close to $US 45 billion. We must not forget that it was 
the process of exiting convertibility that transferred most of the private sector’s 
37. Ibid.
38. See Dinerstein, Contartese and Deledicque 2010.
39. See MEP 2007.
40. See Damill, Frenkel and Maurizio 2007.
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foreign-dollar debt to the state and turned debt-default into an unavoidable 
outcome. Before the debt-restructuring of 2005, public debt (mainly external, 
denominated in international currency) had on average reached 137% of GDP 
between 2002 and 2004. This amounted to almost 10% of GDP in terms of 
interest-payments, something clearly unsustainable in social, political and 
even economic terms, since it represented about half of the surplus-value 
available for accumulation between 2001 and 2002. Debt-restructuring only 
performed the needed devaluation of fĳinancial capital that would allow for the 
interests of capital as a whole to be realised within Argentine capitalism. In 
2008 (during the presidency of Kirchner’s wife, Cristina Fernández, who 
followed him in offfĳice) the government took the decision of recovering for the 
state the control of the pension-funds created in 1993 and also the flow of 
labour-taxes that had been directed towards those funds since then. While this 
was in itself seen as a positive – even radical – decision it was actually mandated 
by the need to increase fĳiscal receipts to maintain the primary fĳiscal surplus of 
the national state to pay for the remaining public debt. This decision, therefore, 
was mainly oriented toward satisfying the need to remain a solvent debtor.
A second severe restriction of the 1990s was the reliance on foreign capital 
to fĳinance an increasing defĳicit in the current account of the balance of 
payments that topped 4.8% in 1998. The economic exit of January 2002, which 
led to devaluation, also created the conditions for a radical reduction of the 
need for foreign savings. The jump in net exports was coupled with the sudden 
fall in consumption and debt-default, creating a gigantic surplus in the current 
account equal to 8.4% of GDP. The actual forces that led to the devaluation are 
related to the process of neoliberal restructuration and not simply to policy-
decisions taken in the aftermath of its crisis. As shown elsewhere,41 the real 
exchange-rate devaluation was forced by falling relative real unit labour-costs 
for most relevant capitals during the 1990s. This resulted in a growing trade-
surplus for big corporations even while it seemed that the real exchange-rate 
was basically uncompetitive or over-appreciated for the economy as a whole.42 
During the 1990s big corporations held a positive trade-balance even when the 
economy taken as a whole presented a signifĳicant defĳicit. Whilst during that 
decade unit-costs fell considerably for industrial enterprises, the exit from the 
neoliberal stage meant a further reduction that allowed all sectors (even 
relatively uncompetitive industrial branches) to swing into trade-surplus. 
Together with a hike in terms of trade in the early 2000s, the current account 
turned structurally positive, eliminating the need for fĳinancial flows to 
41. See Féliz 2007, 2009.
42. See Frenkel 2003; Bonnet 2006.
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equilibrate the balance of payments. The current account has remained in 
surplus since 2002, averaging 4% of GDP up to 2009. The new competitiveness 
seemed to have gradually eliminated the need for permanent foreign fĳinancial 
aid. Argentina moved from a debt-led to an export-led growth-model. Chronic 
excess-demand for foreign currency has been displaced by persistent 
accumulation of international reserves, which rose by 360% between 2002 and 
2009 when they reached $US 48 billion.
Thirdly, while the situation of structural external surplus appears to have 
displaced the external restriction and its immanent contradictions, the new 
situation has created a new set of problems. On the one hand, a persistently 
high real exchange-rate and terms of trade have recreated the imbalanced 
nature of Argentina’s productive base, boiling down to a traditional rent-
producing primary sector coupled with a structurally uncompetitive industrial 
sector. The primary sector (agriculture and, more recently, mining) and basic 
manufactures are the main source of exports and hard currency while industrial 
branches not tied to the former have a structural defĳicit only countered by the 
high real exchange-rate policy.43 Even if higher competitiveness for the 
economy as a whole is – as we have explained – tied to higher relative 
productivity gained during the last stage of the neoliberal period, for the most 
backward branches in the economy competitiveness still relies on deep wage-
devaluation and employment-precarisation.
This dichotomy within the dominant classes creates a signifĳicant tension 
inside the neo-developmentalist project. In 2002 taxes on crop and fuel-exports 
were established to redirect a portion of rent from natural resources towards 
the industrial fractions and ease the fĳiscal position of the state. These transfers 
have become increasingly important, as the state has had to accommodate 
pressures from unions for improving wages and by social movements for 
greater social benefĳits.
This points to a fourth central contradiction of neo-developmentalism. 
Relative productivity has stagnated and in the context of growing wages 
(especially amongst formal, unionised workers), unit-costs have begun to rise. 
This has put pressure on competitiveness, especially for the backward fractions 
of industrial capital.44 The resulting tensions were transferred to market-prices 
by price-setting capitals as an attempt to maintain profĳitability. While rising 
prices may be an adequate short-run solution for individual capitals to displace 
the impact of higher costs, for the capitalist class as a whole this may have a 
negative impact on international competitiveness as the real exchange-rate 
43. See Azpiazu and Schorr 2010.
44. Ibid.
118 M. Féliz / Historical Materialism 20.2 (2012) 105–123
tends to fall as inflation rises. For this reason, as wage-pressures got stronger in 
2005–6 the government intervened to aid corporations setting wage-ceilings. 
Since in the early stages of neo-developmentalism (2003–6) higher wage-
demands came hand in hand with grass-roots agitation,45 the government had 
to rely this time on a combination of bureaucratic control of union-membership 
(mainly through the CGT leadership), the Ministry of Labour’s intervention, 
and targeted repression of relevant conflicts (for example, Buenos Aires’ floating 
casino, Kraft Foods, the synthetic-fĳibres manufacturer Mafĳissa, etc.). This 
strategy was successful in stealing control of the political initiative away from 
grass-roots movements and allowed bureaucracies to channel demands within 
‘rational’ boundaries. However, as the presidential elections of 2007 neared and 
inflationary pressures increased – pushed by commodity-speculation in world-
markets – wage-demands also surged. Unable to halt declining competitiveness, 
the government reformed statistical price-information to hide actual inflation.46 
However, in the year following Cristina Fernández’s 2007 election as president 
as part of the same political alliance of Nestor Kirchner, in an attempt to curb 
increasing prices in foodstufffs the government proposed to increase the rate of 
export-taxes. This generated an unforeseen protest from rural producers and 
exporters, which included roadblocks and massive mobilisations.47 Three 
months later Congress rejected the export-tax hike, with the vice-president of 
the governing coalition and acting president of the Senate voting against his 
own government. In mid-2008, the world-crisis hit Argentina’s economy. While 
the impact on trade was substantial and growth fell to almost zero, a controlled 
nominal devaluation of the currency along with higher unemployment helped 
to control wage-demands; average real wages stagnated for the next two years, 
putting a limit to falling competitiveness. By 2010, the economy recovered its 
impetus and was growing at a nine-percent annual rate. The aforementioned 
tensions continue to characterise a process that has nonetheless shown itself 
to be quite strong and politically stable.48
5. Neo-developmentalism: beyond neoliberalism?
In the previous sections we have discussed the novelties, continuities and 
contradictions surrounding a new stage of capitalist development in Argentina: 
45. See Antón, Cresto, Rebón and Salgado 2010.
46. See ATE-INDEC 2008.
47. See Grigera 2009; Sartelli, Harari, Kabat, Kornblihtt, Baudino, Dachevsky and Sanz Cerbino 
2008.
48. In October 2010 Néstor Kirchner unexpectedly died. In the short-run, this is arguably the 
main sign of difffĳiculties for the continuation of the neo-developmentalist project.
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neo-developmentalism. However, in what sense, if any, can neo-developmentalism 
be called post-neoliberal? In what ways does it surpass the neoliberal project? To 
answer this question we need to acknowledge that neoliberalism was a class-
project led by dominant classes around the world to impose the restructuration 
of capitalist relations of production and reproduction so as to overcome the 
conditions that led to the capitalist crisis in the 1960s and 1970s.49 In South 
America – and particularly in Argentina – fĳirst military dictatorships and, later, 
elected governments were the means for such transformations to come to pass.50 
As such, the neoliberal project was successful in its class-goals.51 During 
the 1990s, in Argentina – as in many other countries of South and Central 
America – social upheavals led by old and new social movements in the context 
of economic contradictions led to the displacement of the neoliberal impetus for 
reform. In many ways this meant – as we have seen for Argentina – the formation 
of new political alliances that have been able to redirect the form of capitalist 
development in new directions.52
Neo-developmentalism has implied a new form of state-intervention, a 
diffferent composition of the working classes (that includes new forms of 
political intervention), and renewed conditions for capital-accumulation. In 
contrast with the structural adjustment of the crisis-ridden neoliberal stage, 
neo-developmentalism in Argentina seems to profĳile a new historical process 
of capitalist development dominated by expanded reproduction of capital in 
the context of peripheral transnationalisation and the structural precariousness 
of living conditions, but with some room for relative improvements led by new 
forms of labour-struggle. The main diffference between the two models is that 
while neoliberalism was a historical process led by the strategy of the dominant 
classes for structural change, neo-developmentalism is a process built on the 
success of such a strategy for the constitution of a renewed base for capitalist 
development. This diffference does not manifest itself so much in the economic 
structure (put in place during the neoliberal stage) but in the new forms and 
results of the sociopolitical intervention of class-actors – in, through and 
beyond the state.
The structural (economic and political) bases for this new form of 
development were put in place during the neoliberal process and particularly 
during the 1990s, above all through the convertibility-strategy. In this sense, 
neo-developmentalism was born out of the transformations brought forth by 
49. See Harvey 2009.
50. See Bonnet and Glavich 1993.
51. See Webber 2010.
52. By contrast, in the ‘developed’ countries the possibilities for working people to successfully 
confront the neoliberal project are still in doubt, as events in recent years seem to indicate.
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neoliberalism. Argentina’s economy is now much more globalised than ever 
before. This can be seen in the internationalisation of local capital and the 
penetration of transnational capital in every form of capital: mercantile 
(international commerce grew from 16.2% of GDP in 1993 to more than 24.2% 
in 1998 and – after the crisis of 2001 – to 23.8% in 2004), fĳinancial (foreign debt 
went from US$ 87.5 billion in 1994 to more than US$ 147.6 billion in 1998, 
reaching US$ 128.2 billion in 2008 – even after the debt-restructuring of 2005) 
and productive (foreign-owned enterprises went from representing 32% of the 
top 500 fĳirms in 1993 to more than 48% in 1998 and 66% in 2007).
In this framework, the state in the periphery, while limited by the heritage 
of the neoliberal period, has had to fĳind new ways to create conditions for 
successful accumulation after the fall of the neoliberal age. The state still 
faces the contradiction between the generalisation of the law of value 
(transnationalisation being its latest form) that tends to erase national borders, 
and the very real exigency of gaining political legitimacy to allow for the 
reproduction of a particular social formation within a particular national 
value-space.53 The idea of a neo-developmentalist state refers to a state-form 
that recognises the power of the working class as a subject within capital and 
thus the need to orient this power to productive use (for capital).54
Neo-developmentalism is more than just ‘a tactical response of the ruling 
classes to adjust to the social contradictions generated by the implementation 
of neoliberalism’.55 In a way, it is a new process of capitalist development that 
includes the recomposition of the labour-classes in old and new forms of 
organisation. From the recognition of these changes comes the granting of 
several ‘concessions’ to workers, concessions that are accompanied by a more 
direct intervention of the governmental apparatus in the regulation of 
economic activity and the promotion of capitalist development.
However, unlike the developmentalist experience of the 1950s and 1960s 
(associated with so-called Fordism), the neo-developmentalist state operates 
in the framework set by a post-neoliberal society characterised by the 
predominance of a wider domination of capitalist relations and transnational 
capital. This limits the character of the state’s intervention and makes it very 
difffĳicult to reintroduce traditional developmentalism. In fact, while the state 
appears to have more clout in the economy than before, the boundaries for 
welfare-policies and for directing the general orientation of capitalist 
development have been strictly narrowed.56 Argentina, as we have discussed, 
53. See Thwaites Rey 2010; Burnham 1997; Panitch and Gindin 2005.
54. See Cleaver 1985.
55. Webber 2010, p. 227.
56. See Thwaites Rey and Castillo 2008.
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is a prime example of this. In the Argentine case, neo-developmentalism is a 
work-in-progress,57 an attempt – so far successful – of the dominant classes to 
maintain their hegemonic control.
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